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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Curtis Jackson appeals from his judgment of conviction for three counts of lewd
and lascivious conduct with a person under sixteen, for which he was sentenced to
three concurrent life terms, with fifteen years fixed on each count. He asserts that he
was deprived of a fair and impartial jury when the district court refused to excuse a
biased juror for cause. Although that juror did not sit in Mr. Jackson's case, the district
court's error was not harmless because Mr. Jackson exhausted all of his peremptory
challenges and two biased jurors sat on his case. Alternatively, those two jurors should
have been removed by the district court for cause sua sponte because of their biases.
The failure to do so constituted fundamental error and this Court should vacate Mr.
Jackson's conviction based on the deprivation of his right to an impartial jury.
Mr. Jackson also contends that the district court erred by denying his request for
assistance of counsel on his motion for relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
based on the fact that he had filed incomplete forms, even though he provided an
explanation for the incompleteness based on factors beyond his control. He contends
that the district court's decision deprived him of his constitutional and statutory rights to
assistance of counsel on his Rule 35 motion.
Therefore, this Court should vacate his conviction because of the biased jury.
Alternatively, it should vacate the decision on his Rule 35 motion and remand for a new
hearing with the assistance of counsel.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Jackson was indicted on three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a
person under the age of sixteen. 1 (R., pp.27-28.) His first jury trial ended in a mistrial
when the jury saw, during their deliberations, an extra portion of one of the exhibits
admitted at trial (a video of the detective's interview with Mr. Jackson, which was not
redacted by the State), which informed them that Mr. Jackson had offered the
opportunity to take a polygraph examination. (See R., pp.98-100 (minutes from the first
trial indicating the discussions held on this issue).) The matter was reset for a second
jury trial. (See, e.g. R., p.108.)
During voir dire for the second trial, Juror #34 stated that "I think with the nature
of this case if it's purely his word against hers and that's it, then I would -- yeah I
would believe the little girl over the grown man." 2 (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.22 - p.108, L.2.)3
Juror #33 indicated that he held a similar view. 4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.108, Ls.3-5.) As a result
of these responses, defense counsel moved to excuse Jurors #33 and #34 for cause.
The prosecutor followed up with some questions to both potential jurors, which were
targeted at their understanding of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Specifically, he was alleged to have inappropriately touched an eight or nine-year-old
~irl with his hands or mouth over the course of several months. (R., pp.27-28.)
The district court and counsel often referred to the jurors by name, rather than number
during the voir dire process. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144 (the extent of the voir
dire portion of the trial).)
3 The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently bound and paginated
volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts
from the jury trial held from May 9, 2011, through May 11, 2011. "Vol.2" will refer to the
volume containing the transcript from the sentencing hearing held on August 16, 2011.
4 In fact, defense counsel noted that there were several other jurors who raised their
hands indicating their agreement with Juror #34's views. (Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.19-21.)
Three were identified on the record: Jurors #17, #28, and #41. ((Tr., Vol.1, p.100,
L.14- p.101, L.8; Tr., Vol.1, p.105, L.14 - p.107, L.13; see Tr., Vol.1, p.141, L.12
(identifying Juror #28).) Defense counsel struck Jurors #17, #28, and #41 from the
1

2

(Tr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.119, L.13.) Juror #33 indicated that he could not hold the
prosecution to that burden. (Tr., Vol.1, p.118, L.25 - p.119, L.3.) Juror #34 indicated
she understood that obligation and thought she might be able to hold the prosecution to
that burden. (Tr., Vol.1, p:118, Ls.4-10.) The prosecutor indicated he had no objection
to excusing Juror #33 for cause, but objected to excusing Juror #34 for cause.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.119, Ls.15-16.)

Juror #33 was excused for cause.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.119,

Ls.17-21.)
Defense counsel continued his voir dire of Juror #34 in regard to her biases and
the standard of proof, which culminated with the following exchange:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you were afraid he did this but you don't think
[the prosecution] proved it, would you find him guilty anyway?

A I guess I would have a hard time if I felt like the prosecution, you know,
didn't.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then maybe your job would be to make up
the difference.

A Put forth enough.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So basically the answer would be yes.

A Yeah.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If they gave you enough to hang your hat on,
even if they didn't really prove beyond a reasonable doubt, just to make
sure, just to make sure, that he doesn't get away with it.
A. Yeah. I -- you know just because of the nature of the case.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8.) Defense counsel renewed his motion to excuse
Juror #34 for cause. That potential juror then stated, without prompting by the district
court or counsel, "I'd like to say that I could follow that oath but with what [defense

panel with peremptory challenges. (Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.3-7; Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.11-13;
Tr., Vol.1, p.142, Ls.11-13.)

3

counsel] was proposing, if that were to happen, I don't know if -- if I would be able to just
keep that beyond a reasonable doubt concrete mindset." (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14.)
The district court denied defense counsel's motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause.
Defense counsel ultimately used one of the defense's peremptory strikes to remove
Juror #34 from the jury panel.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.18-19.)

also exercised all of Mr. Jackson's peremptory challenges.

Defense counsel

(See Tr., Vol.1, p.139,

L.1 - p.143, L.9.)

Other jurors also spoke to other biases that they harbored. For example, Juror
#57 requested a private conversation with the district court and counsel. 5 (Tr., Vol.1,
p.70, Ls.6-13.) Juror #57 indicated that she had personal experience which was similar
to that of the alleged victim in this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-15.) The potential juror
also said that, while she felt confident at that moment of her ability to maintain
impartiality as a juror, she was not at all confident that she could maintain that
impartiality once the presentation of evidence and testimony began. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70,
L.15 - p.71, L.22.) There was no motion to strike Juror #57. (See generally Tr., Vol.1,
pp.1-144.) In fact, Juror #57 sat as a juror on this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.144, Ls.14-18.)
In regard to a different juror, the prosecutor mentioned that he was acquainted
with the husband and son of Juror #54. (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.4-5.) He asked Juror #54
if that relationship would prejudice her as a juror in the case and Juror #54 admitted that
"It might." (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.5-8.) She did clarify that she would try to be fair, but

The district court had been allowing some private voir dire of potential jurors so they
could voice certain concerns about personal matters which might, if discussed in the
presence of the entire jury pool, taint the jury pool. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.49,
L.24 - p.50, L.20.) Most of the jurors who requested such private conversations and
who had personal experiences with similar types of abuse as alleged against
Mr. Jackson were excused from the jury for cause. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.50,
L.24 - p.61, L.20; Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.3 - p.73, L.18.)
5

4

there was no indication that she would be able to set aside her pro-prosecution bias.
Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.9-15; see generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144.) There was no motion
to strike Juror #54. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144.) Juror #54 also sat as a juror
on this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.144, Ls.14-18.)
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Jackson as charged.

(R., pp.147-48.)

The

district court sentenced Mr. Jackson to three concurrent terms of life, with fifteen years
fixed on each sentence. (R., pp.177-80.) Mr. Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.172-73.)

He requested appointment of appellate counsel at public expense

because he was indigent. 6

(R., pp.168, 173.)

Mr. Jackson indicated that he had

exhausted what resources he had in securing trial counsel and had no additional assets
available to pay for continuing representation. (R., p.168.)

With "good cause

appearing," the district court appointed Mr. Jackson appellate counsel at public
expense and waived the other costs associated with appeal pursuant to I.AR. 45.1.
(R., Pp.182-85.)

Mr. Jackson subsequently filed a pro se motion for a reduction of his sentence
pursuant to Rule 35. (R., pp.195-97.) He also filed a prose motion requesting counsel
be appointed to assist him with the Rule 35 motion. 7 (R., pp.190-92.) The affidavit

Mr. Jackson had initially been appointed counsel at public cost for the trial, though that
order was subject to reconsideration "if Defendant is able to post bail." (R., p.21.) After
Mr. Jackson posted bond, the prosecutor moved to examine Mr. Jackson's financial
status based on the magistrate's stated condition. (R., pp.46-47.) Based on the
information presented at the hearing on that motion, the district court determined
Mr. Jackson was not indigent at that time, and denied him the service of the public
defender. (See R., pp.50-53.) Mr. Jackson subsequently hired private counsel to
represent him during the trial. (See R., p.55.)
7 Mr. Jackson indicated that he had requested that his trial attorney file a Rule 35
motion in his case. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011,
p.1.) He also indicated that he had not heard whether his attorney had actually done
so. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p.1.) No motion
in that regard was filed by trial counsel. ( See generally R.)
6
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accompanying the request for counsel was not notarized (see R., p.192), but a letter
from Mr. Jackson was added to the district court's record on December 7, 2012,
indicating that he had been placed in protective custody at the prison when other
inmates assaulted him, and as a result, he believed he was unable to arrange a meeting
with a notary public or a paralegal to complete those forms before the time to file a Rule
35 motion for leniency expired.

(Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis field

December 7, 2011.)8 On December

2012, the district court issued its order in regard

to Mr. Jackson's request for the assistance of counsel. (R., p.193.) It recognized that
he had been found indigent for purposes of appeal and that he had no income.
(R., p.193.)

Nevertheless, it decided to deny his request for assistance of counsel

because the form was not properly filled out. (R., p.193.)
Mr. Jackson continued to attempt to pursue his Rule 35 motion on his own. He
sent another letter to the district court via a friend, Alan Smith, setting out the claims
underlying his Rule 35. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12,
2011, p.13.) Among others things, he asserted that he had been diagnosed with low
testosterone levels by "Dr. Puffer" of Sandpoint, and as a result, he did not have an
active sex drive. 9 (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011,
p.13.)

He contended that this meant lacked the ability to form the level of desire

necessary to commit the acts for which he was found guilty was a factor that should
have been considered in mitigation, but which was not presented during sentencing.

(See Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p. 13.) The

8

This letter was attached to the record as a Miscellaneous Exhibit. The same is true of
the Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, referenced infra.
9 Mr. Jackson indicated that this information had been presented at the first trial, but at
no other time. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p.13.)

6

district court, however, denied Mr. Jackson's motion for Rule 35 relief, asserting that the
sentence was not excessive. (R., pp.201-04.)

7

ISSUES
1.

Whether Mr. Jackson was deprived of an impartial jury when the district court
refused to excuse a biased juror for cause.

2.

Whether the district court erred by refusing to appoint Mr. Jackson an attorney to
help him pursue his Rule 35 motion.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Jackson Was Deprived Of An Impartial Jury \/\/hen The District Court Refused To
Excuse A Biased Juror For Cause
A.

Introduction
One of the potential jurors for Mr. Jackson's trial expressed her bias to believe

the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson, as well as her willingness to convict him even if the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
denied Mr. Jackson's motion to excuse that juror for cause.

The district court

That decision was in

error and it is reversible because it was not harmless. After Mr. Jackson exercised all
his allotted peremptory strikes, two other biased jurors remained on Mr. Jackson's jury.
Alternatively, the district court committed fundamental error by not removing those two
other biased jurors for cause sua sponte.

Either way, the district court's actions

deprived Mr. Jackson of his state and federal constitutional right to an impartial jury. As
a result, this Court should vacate his conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

B.

By Denying Mr. Jackson's Motion To Excuse A Biased Juror For Cause, The
District Court Deprived Mr. Jackson Of A Fair Trial By An Impartial Jury
A defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial

jury. U.S. CONST. amend VI; IDAH0 CONST. art. I, § 17. When a defendant has to use a
peremptory challenge to rectify the district court's erroneous denial of a motion to
excuse a juror for cause, the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no
Sixth Amendment right to the use of that peremptory challenge; rather, the focus is
on the jurors who actually sat on the case and whether they were impartial.
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89 (1988).

The Idaho Supreme Court has

consistently held that, where a biased juror is not excused for cause, that constitutes
9

error. See, e.g., Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54 (2011); State v. Ramos,
119 Idaho 568, 569-70 (1990); State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 31

319 (1971), overruled

on other grounds by State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 7 (1975).

However, that error is only reversible if it was not harmless. See, e.g., Ramos,
1·19 Idaho at 570 ("[The defendant] has not demonstrated, nor has he even suggested,
that any of the other jurors remaining on the panel were not impartial or were biased.
Thus, if there was any error, it was harmless."); Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354-55
(reaffirming Ramos in this regard). As such, where a motion to excuse a biased juror
for cause is erroneously denied and the defendant uses a peremptory challenge to
remove that potential juror from the panel, that constitutes reversible error if the
defendant exhausts all his peremptory challenges and a biased juror remains on the
jury. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 569-70; see Ross, 487
U.S. at 89, 90-91.

Additionally, there need not be a motion to dismiss the other jurors for cause to
demonstrate reversible error based on the erroneous refusal to dismiss the challenged
juror for cause.

Rather, the members of the jury panel who sat on the case are

examined for bias to demonstrate the non-harmless nature of the district court's
erroneous ruling. 10 See Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570.

The simple fact that biased jurors

sat as members of the jury demonstrates that the panel was not impartial, and

Whether or not those other jurors should have been on the panel in the first place is
not the question. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether or not defense counsel moved to
excuse them from the panel. The mere fact that they remained on the panel after the
defense exercised all its peremptory strikes and that they had biases against the
defendant or for the State is all that is required under Ramos and Nightengale. See
Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354. In any case, because of the
fast-paced, highly-pressured nature of voir dire and challenges of jurors for cause, see,
e.g., Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316, the fact that there was no objection should not
trump the constitutional requirement that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.
10

10

therefore, the erroneous denial of the motion to dismiss the biased juror for cause
constitutes reversible error in this case. See id.; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354.
Mr. Jackson has met the Nightengale standard. In this case, Mr. Jackson moved
the district court to excuse Juror #34 for cause after it became clear that she was biased
against him. 11

(Tr., Vol.1, p.108, Ls.18-23.)

For example, Juror #34 said, "I think

with the nature of this case if it's purely his word against hers and that's it, then I
would --yeah I would believe the little girl over a grown man."

(Tr., Vol.1, p.107,

L.22 - p.108, L.5.) When further voir dire of Juror #34 occurred, she revealed additional
biases against Mr. Jackson:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you were afraid he did this but you don't think
[the prosecution] proved it, would you find him guilty anyway?
A. I guess I would have a hard time if I felt like the prosecution, you know,

didn't.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then maybe your job would be to make up
the difference.
A. Put forth enough.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So basically the answer would be yes.
A. Yeah.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If they gave you enough to hang your hat on,
even if they didn't really prove beyond a reasonable doubt, just to make
sure, just to make sure, that he doesn't get away with it.
A. Yeah. I -- you know just because of the nature of the case.

Defense counsel also moved to excuse Juror #33 for cause based on the same
biases as Juror #34. (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.5 (Juror #33 admitting if it were
just the alleged victim's word against Mr. Jackson, he would believe the alleged victim
over Mr. Jackson); Tr., Vol.1, p.118, L.25 - p.119, L.3 (Juror #33 admitting that, even if
he was not convinced Mr. Jackson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he would still
convict Mr. Jackson); Tr., Vol.1, p.119, Ls.17-18 (excusing Juror #33 for cause).) The
only difference between Jurors #33 and #34 was that the prosecutor did not object to
excusing Juror #34. (Compare Tr., Vol.1, p.119 L.15 with Tr., Vol.1, p.119, Ls.15-16.)
11

11

(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8.)

After defense counsel renewed his motion to

excuse Juror #34 for cause, the juror added of her own accord: "I'd just like to say that I
could follow that oath but with what [defense counsel] was proposing, if that were to
happen, I don't know if -- if I would be able to just keep that beyond a reasonable doubt
concrete mindset." (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14.) At that point, Juror#34 had expressed
her predisposition to believe the alleged victim's account over the defendant's account,
as well as her concern about her ability to hold the State to its burden of proof. 12 Those
inferences indicating bias revealed that Juror #34 should have been removed for
cause. 13 See I.C. § 19-2019(2); State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 610 (Ct. App. 2006).
The district court, however, denied Mr. Jackson's motion to excuse Juror #34
for those biases. (Tr., Vol.1, p.132, Ls.16-17.) As a result, Mr. Jackson exercised one
of his peremptory challenges to remove Juror #34 from the jury.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.141,

Ls.18-19.) Defense counsel also exercised all of Mr. Jackson's peremptory challenges.

12

While the prosecutor did attempt to rehabilitate the juror in regard to the burden of
proof (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, L.15 - p.132, L.8), no such rehabilitation was attempted in
regard to her assertion that she would believe the alleged victim rather than
Mr. Jackson. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144.) Therefore, even if the prosecutor's
rehabilitative questions were to cure the issue regarding Juror #34's bias regarding the
reasonable doubt standard (which Mr. Jackson does not concede, especially given
Juror #34's spontaneous statement about her inability to hold the State to the
reasonable doubt standard), Juror #34 should have been excused for cause based on
her unrefuted bias in favor of the alleged victim. Compare State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho
603, 610 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that, where voir dire produces no assurance that the
juror will lay aside her bias and render an impartial verdict, the defendant has been
deprived of his right to an impartial jury and is entitled to a new trial).
13 The Legislature has provided that a juror may be challenged for "particular cause"
when that potential juror has a state of mind which leads "to the inference that he will
not act with entire impartiality." I.C. § 19-2019(2) (emphasis added). Any question
about a potential juror's impartiality is to be resolved in favor of the defendant. Hauser,
143 Idaho at 610. Therefore, if there is an inference from a member of the jury that
deliberates that he will not act with entire impartiality, then the jury is impermissibly
biased, depriving him of his constitutional rights to an unbiased jury. See Parker, 385
U.S. at 365-66; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610.
12

(See Tr., Vol.1, p.139, L.1 - p.143, L.9.) Nevertheless, two of the jurors who sat on the
panel had expressed biases against Mr. Jackson which, because they sat on his
jury, deprived him of his constitutional rights to an impartial jury.

See,

e.g.,

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966) ("[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by

·12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors."); Nightengale, 151 Idaho at
353-54; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 6·10.
The first of the biased jurors who sat on the panel was Juror #57. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.144, Ls. 14-18 (revealing Juror #57 was a member of the jury).)

She requested a

private voir dire with the district court and counsel. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.6-7.) Juror #57
indicated that she had a personal experience similar to that of the alleged victim in this
case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-16.) As a result, she repeatedly told the district court and
counsel that she was not confident she could remain impartial once the testimony
began to be offered in this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.16-22; Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.16-19.)
And while she said she was usually able to keep her emotions in check, she never
backed away from her concern that she could not be impartial in this case. 14

( See

Tr., Vol.1, p.70, L.1 - p.72, L.23.) And yet, even with that bias, Juror #57 sat on the
case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.144, Ls.14-18.)
The second biased juror to sit on Mr. Jackson's jury was Juror #54.

The

prosecutor noted that he was an acquaintance of Juror #54's husband and son, and
when he asked Juror #54 if that relationship would affect her ability to remain impartial,
Juror #54 responded that "It might." (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.4-8.) While Juror #54 indicated
that she would try to be fair as a juror, she never backed away from her assertion that

14

Most of the other jurors who expressed similar concerns were excused for cause.
(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.50, L.24 - p.61, L.20; Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.3 - p.73, L.18.)
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the relationship between the prosecutor and her family was a bias that she might not be
able to keep under control. (See generally Tr.) And yet, even with that bias, Juror #54
sat on the case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.144, Ls.14-18.)
As a result, the district court's erroneous decision to not excuse Juror #34 for
cause was not harmless.

Compare Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119

Idaho at 569-70; Wozniak, 94 Idaho at 319. Mr. Jackson was deprived of a fair and
impartial jury because the district court denied his motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause,
he used a peremptory challenge on Juror #34, he used all the peremptory strikes
allotted to him, and at least one of the remaining jurors was biased against him. See
Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho

569-70. The fact that at least

one of the jurors who did sit on the panel was biased reveals that the district court's
failure to excuse Juror #34 for cause when it was merited was not harmless. Id. As
such, his conviction should be vacated for that violation of his constitutional rights.
See id.

C.

Because Jurors #54 and #57 Had Expressed Bias Against Mr. Jackson, The
District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Not Removing Them For Cause
Sua Sponte
The question, when it comes to biased jurors, is whether the jury panel as a

whole was impartial. See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89. When a juror expresses bias
which leads "to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality," that juror needs
to be removed from the panel for that particular cause.

I.C. § 19-2019(2) (emphasis

added); Parker, 385 U.S. at 365-66; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. When a biased juror sits
on the jury, the conviction must be vacated because the defendant has been deprived
of his state and federal constitutional rights to impartial juries. Ross, 487 U.S. at 85;
United States v. Marlinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000) (holding there was no error
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where "the District Court's ruling [did not] result in the seating of any juror who should
have been dismissed for cause.

As we have recognized, that circumstance would

require reversal"); Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610.

Where defense counsel does not

preserve the issue before the district court, this becomes a question of fundamental
error. See State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861-62 (2009). To show fundamental error,
the defendant must demonstrate that (1) one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error is clear from the face of the record; and
(3) the error prejudiced the defendant. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).
The right to an impartial jury is expressly protected under both the United States
and Idaho Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend VI; IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 17. That right is
also protected as a matter of due process under both the state and federal constitutions.
U.S. CONST. amend V, XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 13; see Morgan V. /1/inois, 504
U.S. 719, 726 (1992); State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 69 (2011 ). Mr. Jackson did not
waive his right to an impartial jury. (See generally Tr., R.) When a biased juror sits on
the panel, the defendant is deprived of this right.

See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85;

Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 611. Therefore, the fact that
two biased jurors sat on Mr. Jackson's jury demonstrates that one of Mr. Jackson's
constitutional rights was violated, satisfying the first prong of Perry.
The violation is clear from the record. First, Juror #57 indicated that she had a
personal experience similar to that of the alleged victim in this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70,
Ls.14-16.) As a result, she repeatedly told the district court and counsel that she was
not confident she could remain impartial once the testimony began to be offered in this
case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.16-22; Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.16-19.) And while she said she
was usually able to keep her emotions in check, she never backed away from her
15

concern that she could not be impartial in this case. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.70, L.1 - p.72,
L.23.) Where voir dire does not produce an assurance that the juror will lay aside her
bias and render an impartial verdict, that juror needs to be removed for cause. Hauser,
143 Idaho at 610-11; see Ross, 487 U.S. at 85; Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316.

Therefore, Juror #57's bias is clear from the record, as is the fact that she sat on the
panel. Thus, the violation of Mr. Jackson's right to an impartial jury is clear from the
record, satisfying the second prong of Perry.
Second, Juror #54 indicated that a familial relationship between her husband,
son, and the prosecutor might affect her ability to remain impartial.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.77,

Ls.4-8.) And while Juror #54 indicated that she would try to be fair as a juror, she never

offered an assurance that she would lay aside that bias and render an impartial verdict.

Compare Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11 (holding that, where "voir dire produced no
assurance that the juror would lay aside his prejudices and render an impartial verdict,"
the record failed to demonstrate that the juror would act fairly and impartially).
Therefore, Juror #54's bias is clear from the record, as is the fact that she sat on the
panel. Thus, the violation of Mr. Jackson's right to an impartial jury is clear from the
record, satisfying the second prong of Perry.
Finally, the mere fact that two biased jurors sat as members of the jury also
constitutes prejudice. Ross, 487 U.S. at 85; Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316; Hauser,
143 Idaho at 610-11.

Perry only requires the defendant to show a "reasonable

possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial" to demonstrate prejudice and
satisfy the third prong of the analysis.
_

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; State v. Velasco,

P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.10, 7-8 (Ct. App. 2013). The jury, which contained two

biased panel members, returned a verdict of guilty.
16

(R., pp.147-48.)

There is

a

reasonable possibility that the biases of the jurors contributed to that decision.
Therefore, the third prong of Perry is also met.
As such, because of the biases expressed by Jurors #54 and #57, the district
court should have removed them for cause sua sponte. Compare Adams, 147 Idaho
857 (holding the record in that case was insufficiently clear to prove fundamental error
because "[a]t no time did the juror indicate she was biased against criminal defendants
or in favor of the State"). The failure to do so constitutes fundamental error because it
deprived Mr. Jackson of an impariial jury. See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85; MartinezSa/azar, 528 U.S. at 316; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 569-70; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11.

As such, his conviction should be vacated and this case remanded for further
proceedings.

11.
The District Court Erred By Refusing To Appoint Mr. Jackson An Attorney To Help Him
Pursue His Rule 35 Motion

A

Introduction
Mr. Jackson, who had already been found to be indigent and who had no

income, was denied the assistance of counsel on his Rule 35 motion in violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as well as Idaho statutes, which specifically entitled
him to an attorney during that process. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny
his request for an attorney, premised only on the fact that the forms he submitted were
improperly filled out, was erroneous. Therefore, even if his conviction stands, this Court
should vacate the denial of Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 motion and remand his for a hearing
with the assistance of counsel.
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B.

Mr. Jackson Was Entitled To Have An Attorney Appointed To Assist Him With
His Rule 35 Motion, And The District Court Erroneously Denied Him That
Assistance
The Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution provides a defendant the right to

the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the adversarial process. U.S. CONST.
amends VI, XIV;

IDAHO

CONST. art. I, § 13; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224

(1967); Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562 (2006).

In Idaho, that right is also

provided by statute and recognized in case law. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923
n.3 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing I.C. § 19-851 et seq.; I.C.R. 44). The critical stages of the
criminal proceedings are those where the defendant faces "potential substantial
prejudices to the defendant's rights in the particular confrontation and [needs] the ability
of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562 (quoting Wade, 388
U.S. at 227). Pursuit of a Rule 35 motion is a critical stage at which the defendant is
entitled to counsel. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523 (Ct. App. 1994 ); Murray, 121
Idaho at 923 n.3.

That right may only be denied if the district court finds that the

Rule 35 motion "is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding.
Wade, 125 Idaho at 523 (quoting I.C. § 19-852(b)(3)). 15

15

The portions of I.C. §19-852 relevant to this case provide:
(a) A needy person who ... is being detained under a conviction of[ ] a
serious crime[] is entitled:
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person
having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of
representation (including investigation and preparation).
The
attorney, services, and facilities and the court costs shall be
provided at public expense to the extent that the person is, at the
time the court determines need, unable to provide for their payment
(b) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under
subsection (a) is entitled:
18

The reason that the pursuit of a Rule 35 motion is a critical stage is:
[f]ew indigents can marshal the evidence of mitigating circumstances
necessary to win a reduction of sentence. Fewer still have the negotiating
tools to use a [Fed. Rules. Cr. Proc.] 35 motion as a last opportunity to
exchange cooperation with the prosecution for its support of a lighter
sentence. . . . [The guidance of counsel] is no less essential [in such
circumstances].
United States v. Morales, 498 F.Supp. 139, 1

(E.D.N.Y. 1980); see Murray, 121 Idaho

at 923 n.3. Therefore, indigent persons invoking Rule 35 face substantial prejudice if
they do not have access to an attorney: their final chance to earn leniency from the
district court, to either regain some liberty or decrease the time until they are able to
regain some liberty, will be rendered meaningless if they are not able to present
adequate evidence and argument in support of their motions. See State v. Huffman,
144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (requiring that, to successfully pursue a Rule 35 motion, "the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently presented to the district court").

In order to do that, as the

Morales Court observed, the defendant (particularly the incarcerated defendant) needs
the assistance of counsel to effectively marshal and present that evidence. Therefore,
the constitutional provisions creating a federal and a state right to counsel apply at the
Rule 35 stage of the criminal proceedings.

(3) to be represented in any other post-conviction or postcommitment proceeding that the attorney or the needy person
considers appropriate, unless the court in which the proceeding is
brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable
person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own
expense and is therefore frivolous.
(c) A needy person's right to a benefit under subsection (a) or (b) is
unaffected by his having provided a similar benefit at his own expense, or
by his having waived it, at an earlier stage.
19

Regardless of whether Mr. Jackson's right to counsel emanates from the federal
Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, or statute, it was violated by the district court's
decision to deny his request for an attorney.
Mr. Jackson's claim was frivolous.

Notably, it did not determine that

(See R., p.193 (denying Mr. Jackson's request

for an attorney only because he did not fill out the request form properly); see also
R., pp.201-04 (considering the merits of Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 claim).) Absent such a
finding, Mr. Jackson had a right to counsel for his Rule 35 motion so long as he qualified
as "a needy person" under the statute. I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).
Mr. Jackson qualified as a "needy person" since he was being detained after a
conviction for a serious crime. I.C. § 19-852(a). Therefore, he was entitled to have an
attorney for his Rule 35 motion which had not been found to be frivolous. I.C. § 19-852;

Murray, 121 Idaho at 923 n.3; Wade, 125 Idaho at 523. Additionally, he was entitled to
that attorney at public expense because the information in the record revealed that he
had no resources upon which he could draw to hire counsel. (R., p.168.) The fact that
he was able to pay for counsel during his trial is irrelevant to this determination.
I.C. §19-852(c).

In fact, the district court possessed information demonstrating that

Mr. Jackson qualified as a needy person, as "[t]his Court considers Mr. Jackson indigent
for the purposes of appeal ... and Mr. Jackson has no income." (R., p.193.) At that
point, Mr. Jackson had already been appointed counsel based on Mr. Jackson's motion
because he was unemployed and had been for some time prior to his conviction, he had
very limited assets to his name, and he had "exhausted all resources available in
securing trial counsel and is unable to secure counsel to prosecute this appeal."
(R., p.168.) In fact, part of Mr. Jackson's request was based on the fact that the district
court had already found him indigent. (Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis file
20

December 7, 2011.)

Therefore, the district court, with "good cause appearing," had

already determined Mr. Jackson to be indigent and excused of paying court costs in
association with I.AR. 45.1.

(R., p.182.)

As such, at the time he filed his request,

Mr. Jackson qualified as a needy person for purposes of appointment of counsel at
public expense. I.C. § 19-852(a).
Nevertheless, the district court denied Mr. Jackson's request for Rule 35 counsel
because he did not fill out the request form properly (i.e., did not get the affidavit
notarized).

(R., p.193.)

Mr. Jackson had provided information to the district court

explaining the reason for not having the affidavit notarized:

he believed that, due to

factors beyond his control and being moved to protective custody, he could not secure a
meeting with the notary public or the paralegal before the filing period for his Rule 35
motion expired. (Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis file December 7, 2011; see

R., pp.193-94 (the order denying the request for counsel, entered on December 9,
2011 ).

In that letter, Mr. Jackson made it clear that he was trying to meet all the

requirements in regard to his Rule 35 motion, but he was having problems in that regard
due to his lack of access to the proper personnel, and so repeatedly requested the
assistance of counsel. 16 (Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis file December 7,
2011.) To deny Mr. Jackson's request for assistance of counsel because he had been
unable to properly fill out the form as a result of factors beyond his control only serves to
promote form over substance, which is improper. See, e.g., In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275,
279 (2005) (the Idaho courts "will not exalt form over substance"); Schwartz v. State,

16

While it is unclear if trial counsel remained on Mr. Jackson's case, or if he had
withdrawn, Mr. Jackson made it clear he was not receiving assistance from trial counsel
in regard to filing or pursuing his Rule 35 motion. (Letter from Defendant to Janet
Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p.1; Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed
December 7, 2011.)
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145 Idaho 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with
respect to post-judgment pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs
over form.").
In Schwartz, the district court actually appointed the defendant counsel in her
criminal case based only on a letter requesting the assistance of counsel to prepare a
post-conviction petition. Schwartz, 145 Idaho at 188, 190. In fact, the Court of Appeals
has rejected procedural bars against litigants based on less-than-perfect paperwork,
preferring "a policy of judicial fairness," preserving issues for determination on their
merits rather than penalizing litigants for less-than-proper filings. Weller v. State, 146
Idaho 652, 655 (Ct. App. 2008).

Therefore, the district court's decision to deny

Mr. Jackson's request for the assistance of counsel based only on the propriety of his
filing violated his constitutional and statutory right to counsel to assist in his pursuit of
Rule 35 relief. The error is especially clear given the explanation as to why the forms
were filed as they were (included in the district court's record at the time of the
erroneous decision), as well as the facts recognized by the district court in regard to
Mr. Jackson's financial status vis-a-vis his present ability to privately secure counsel
(which were also supported by documents already in the district court's record at the
time of the erroneous decision).
Therefore, the district court's decision to deny Mr. Jackson the assistance of
counsel in pursuit of his motion for Rule 35 relief violated Mr. Jackson's constitutional
and statutory rights to an attorney. As a result, this Court should at least vacate the
order denying Mr. Jackson that relief and remand for new Rule 35 proceedings with the
assistance of counsel provided to Mr. Jackson.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remand his case for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he requests that the order

denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and the matter remanded for a hearing with the
assistance of an attorney.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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